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The Living Will: Preservation of the
Right-to-Die Demands Clarity and
Consistency
There is no way that there can be a set of rules to govern
this circumstance. Guidelines perhaps are possible, but not
rules. I can think of no more tragic circumstance to come on
the practice of medicine and no more tragic circumstances for a
future patient to face than to have a legal decision made by
someone in the field of jurisprudence who has not lived through
these circumstances, and who could not in a lifetime of testi-
mony understand what the problems are and how they should
be handled. His training, experience and his emotions have not
been intimately involved with similar circumstances in the past
where his decision and his decision alone is the one that must
answer all the questions, no matter how inadequately.'
I. Introduction
Life may be artificially prolonged to extreme lengths through
the use of medical technology.2 Despite these medical achievements,
many people wish to avoid being kept alive through artificial means
and prefer to die naturally. As the likelihood of death increases, peo-
1. Armstrong & Colen, From Quinlan to Jobes: The Courts and the PVS Patient, HAS-
TINGS CENTER REP., Feb.- Mar. 1988, at 37, 40 quoting C. Everett Koop, former Surgeon
General of the United States. This admonition was issued shortly after the New Jersey Su-
preme Court's decision in In Re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976), to terminate Miss
Quinlan's life-support apparatus following the onset of a persistent vegetative state. See infra
note 22. Due to the reasons Mr. Koop gave, the living will should be perfected or at least
modified to clarify ambiguity in order to avoid the judicial system.
2. Almost 80% of all deaths occur in institutions such as hospitals, which provide medi-
cal treatment to save or artificially sustain life. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHI-
CAL. MEDICAL AND LEGAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RE-
SEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT: ETHICAL, MEDICAL AND LEGAL
ISSUES IN TREATMENT DECISIONS, 17 (Mar. 1983) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT].
Moreover, an estimated 5,000 to 10,000 Americans presently exist in a persistent vegetative
state because no medical directives were made to provide for future medical decisions. N.Y.
Times, Dec. 3, 1989, § 6 (Magazine), at 38, 40.
Although many people protect their financial assets and relatives by preparing a standard
will, few plan for the inability to make future medical decisions. SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING,
U.S. SENATE. A MATTER OF CHOICE: PLANNING AHEAD FOR HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, 1987,
cited in Hoffman, Planning for Medical Decision Making. Living Wills and Durable Powers
of Attorney, 38(2) MD. MED. J. 154, 154 n.1 (Feb. 1989). A 1986 SRI Gallup/Hospitals poll
revealed that only 9% of Americans have executed living wills even though over 70% are
willing to forego life-sustaining treatment. At the same time, over 48% of Americans have
executed a standard will. Steiber, Right to die: Public Balks at Deciding for Others, 61
Hosps., Mar. 5, 1987, at 72.
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pie frequently become more concerned with the quality rather than
the quantity of life remaining. A living will provides a way for pa-
tients to clearly state their own desires in the event that they become
terminally ill and unable to make medical decisions.
A living will, also called an advanced directive,3 documents a
person's treatment preferences when, after certain triggering condi-
tions have occurred, that person is unable to communicate these
preferences." When all hope of recovery is gone and a patient is no
longer competent to make treatment decisions, the living will be-
comes effective. The right to execute a living will stems from an ex-
tension of the fundamental right of self-determination.' Life and
death decisions are not at issue; the decision is between a natural
death and an unnaturally postponed death.
Increasingly, Americans are entrusting their future medical de-
cision-making power to living wills.6 Living wills have been endorsed
by medical and public interest groups7 and nearly every state.8
When first proposed, living wills appeared to be the solution to a
long recognized dilemma. Unfortunately, inherent flaws in living
wills make them less than authoritative.'
Living wills confront significant problems that impede their ef-
fectiveness. State statutes are not uniform; instead they are plagued
by vague, narrow terminology and statutory definitions that tend to
create overly restrictive requirements.1" Moreover, the lack of legal
precedent11 tends to cripple the enforceability of the statutes. 2 For
these' reasons, the benefits sought by statutory recognition of the liv-
3. Rosoff, Where There's a Living Will, There's a Way, THE COMPLEAT LAW, Fall 1988
at II.
4. Id. Specifically, while still competent and capable of conveying his or her thoughts, a
patient states in a living will that if his or her condition becomes incurable and his or her
bodily state vegetative, with no hope of recovery, consent to further treatment would be termi-
nated. Kutner, Due Process of Euthanasia: The Living Will, a Proposal, 44 IND. L.J. 539, 551
(1969).
5. This right allows an individual to refuse to permit a physician to treat him or her,
even if such treatment would prolong his or her life. This right, however, does not allow an
individual to direct another to commit euthanasia. Kutner, supra note 4, at 550.
6. Carey, The Faulty Promise of 'Living Wills', U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 24,
1989, at 63.
7. Id.
8. See infra note 28.
9. See infra notes 64-101 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 44-64 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 64-101 and accompanying text.
12. Patients place their future decision-making power in living wills expecting the living
will to be honored. The living will may prove to be inadequate at a time when the executor is
already past the state of competency to make revisions. Therefore, legislative changes must be
made to avoid the harm that would result if a living will's directions are not honored because
of vagueness.
THE LIVING WILL
ing will"3 have fallen short of state legislative goals. The time has
come for a clear and effective declaration.' " Only through an under-
standing of the moral concepts, reasoning, and principles involved in
this delicate area can legislators attempt to incorporate these ideas
into living will legislation.' 5 The focus of legislation will then be di-
rected toward the physical and mental condition of the patient rather
than specific medical treatments, which in turn will create fewer in-
terpretive problems.'" A living will, properly executed according to
clear statutory language, will then dispense with judicial intervention
because it will allow the executor to declare, without ambiguity,
when life is no longer meaningful.' 7 Because courts lack the exper-
tise to make value judgments involving the meaning of human life,
reliance upon the judicial system should be avoided.' 8
This Comment addresses the inherent inadequacies of present
living will directives. Part II traces the development of the living
will, its vague terminology, and the dilemmas legislators face in
drafting a clear, effective declaration. Part III of this Comment dis-
cusses the unfortunate results of some ambiguous living wills. These
tragic outcomes demonstrate a need for legislative revision in order
to avoid judicial intervention. Parts IV and V explore potentially ef-
fective declarations, specific areas that should be addressed, and sug-
gestions for both long-term and immediate modifications. Finally,
Part VI suggests that immediate action be taken before the courts
are required to make any further decisions on an issue they are ill-
equipped to handle.
II. Historical Background
A. The Origin of the Living Will
Luis Kutner, an Illinois attorney, first proposed the living will in
1969." The living will is premised on the belief that every person
possesses the ultimate right to decide what is to be done to his or her
body - including the right to decide whether he or she should be
13. See Kutner, supra note 4, at 551-52.
14. See infra notes 103-15 and accompanying text.
15. Living wills attempt to protect the sanctity of life. Dying in an unnatural manner,
sustained by life-prolonging treatment, destroys the sense of dignity accompanying life itself.
Living wills provide the means to possess the ultimate control over one's life. This control
rightly belongs to a person and should not be lost simply because legislators fail to adequately
provide for the importance of this right when drafting living will legislation.
16. See infra notes 44-64 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 142-53 and accompanying text.
18. See supra note I and accompanying text.
19. See Kutner, supra note 4 at 539.
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permitted to die." The issues surrounding the use of living wills,
however, were not fully recognized and addressed until 1976 when
significant statutory and judicial declarations were made. In that
year, the California Legislature enacted the "Natural Death Act"'"
and the New Jersey Supreme Court decided the case of In re Quin-
lan.2 To date, over 9% of Americans have executed a living will,
23
and according to one study, 89.7% of the physicians surveyed sup-
ported the legal authority of living wills.
2 4
The living will can take one of two forms.25 The first form is
statutory26 and necessarily follows the state's living will statute.
20. Kutner, supra note 4, at 550. In essence, a doctor is acting as a trustee of a patient's
body resulting from a patient's consent or nonconsent to treatment written in a living will. A
patient may not be forced to accept treatment contrary to his wishes and may at any time
revoke the living will, thereby removing the trust. Id. at 552.
21. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-195 (West Supp. 1989). California's Act
gave civil and criminal immunity to health-care personnel who honored living wills and im-
posed liability on those who refused to honor them. See id. § 7190. The Act provided a basis
for numerous states to enact similar legislation.
22. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976). In Quinlan, the court faced the issue of a termi-
nally ill patient's right to refuse life-sustaining treatment. Despite the lack of a living will or a
statute validating a living will, the court held that the patient's right to privacy must be bal-
anced against the state's interests in preserving life. The court recognized that as the degree of
bodily invasion increased, the state's interests decreased while the right to privacy grew; the
court therefore held that the life-support apparatus should be terminated. Id. at 27, 355 A.2d
at 664.
23. Steiber, Right to die: Public Balks at Deciding for Others, Hosps. Mar. 5, 1987, at
72.
24. Shapiro, Tavill, Rivkin & Gruchow, Living Will in Wisconsin, 85 WIs. MED. J., Oct.
1986, at 17, 20. Additionally, over 90% of the physicians surveyed agreed with the idea of
withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment when a patient is terminally ill. Id. at 19-
20. See generally Rosoff, supra note 3, at 10.
25. Rosoff, supra note 3, at 11.
26. An example of a statutory living will is as follows:
MY LIVING WILL AND DIRECTIVE TO MY PHYSICIANS
Directive made this day of 19-. I,
residing in the County of , State of ,
being of sound mind, willfully and voluntarily make known my desire that my
life shall not be artificially prolonged under the circumstances set forth below
and do hereby declare:
1. If at any time I should have an incurable injury, disease, or illness
certified to be a terminal condition by two physicians, and where the ap-
plication of life-sustaining procedures would serve only to artificially pro-
long the moment of my death and where my physician determines that
my death is imminent whether or not life-sustaining procedures are uti-
lized, I direct that such procedures be withheld or withdrawn, and I be
permitted to die naturally.
2. In the absence of my ability to give directions regarding the use of
such life-sustaining procedures, it is my intention that this directive shall
be honored by my family and physicians(s) as the final expression of my
legal right to refuse medical or surgical treatment and accept the conse-
quences from such refusal.
3. If I have been diagnosed as pregnant and that diagnosis is known to
my physician, this directive shall have no force or effect during the course
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Since 1976, following California's Natural Death Act, 27 forty-one
states and the District of Columbia have enacted living will stat-
utes.28 In general, statutory living wills are straightforward docu-
ments that are relatively simple to prepare and execute. One must
simply fill in the spaces provided. Most statutory living will forms
also provide a space for "other instructions."2 9 In this space, the pa-
of my pregnancy.
4. I have been diagnosed and notified at least 14 days ago as having a
terminal condition by M.D., whose address is
__ , and whose
telephone number is I understand that if I have not
filled in the physician's name and address, it shall be presumed that I did
not have a terminal condition when I made out this directive.
5. 1 understand the full import of this directive and I am emotionally
and mentally competent to make this directive.
Dated: , 19_
Principal
This declarant has been personally known to me and I believe him to
be of sound mind.
Residing at
Residing at
D. CLIFFORD. THE POWER OF ATTORNEY BOOK at 6:13 (1988).
27. See supra note 21.
28. See ALA. CODE §§ 22-8A-1 to -10 (1984); ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.12.010 to .100
(1986); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3201 - 3210 (1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-17-201 to -
218 (Supp. 1989); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1989); COLO.
REV. STAT. §§ 15-18-101 to -113 (1987 & Supp. 1990); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 19a-570 - 575
(Supp. 1989); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 §§ 2501 - 2509 (1983); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2421 -
2430 (1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 765.01 - .15 (West 1986); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-32-1 to -12
(Harrison Supp. 1989); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 327D-1 - 27 (Supp. 1989); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-
4501 - 4509 (1985 & Supp. 1990); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2 §§ 701 - 710 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1989); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-8-1 1-1 to -22 (Burns 1990); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 144A. I
- .11 (West 1989 & Supp. 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-28, 101 to 65-28, 120 (1985); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 311.622-.644 (Baldwin 1990); LA. REV. STAT. ANN §§ 40:1299.58.1 -. 10
(West Supp. 1990); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 2921 - 2931 (Supp 1989); MD. HEALTH-
GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 5-601 - 614 (1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 145B.01-.17 (West Supp.
1990); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-101 - 121 (Supp. 1989); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 459.010 - .055
(Vernon Supp. 1990); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-9-101 - 50-9-104, 111, 201 - 206 (1989);
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 449.540 - .690 (1989); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 137-H:1 to H:16 (Supp.
1989); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7-1 - 11 (1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-320 - 322 (1985);
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 23-06.4-01 to -14 (Supp. 1989); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 3101 -
3111 (West Supp. 1990); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 97.050 - .090 (1987); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-77-
10 - 160 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1989); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 32-11-101 - 110 (Supp. 1990); TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 672.001 (Vernon 1990); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-1101 - 1118
(Supp. 1989); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 §§ 5251 - 5262 and tit. 13, § 1801 (1987); VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 54.1-2981 to -2292 (1988); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.122.010 to .905 (Supp.
1989); W. VA. CODE §§ 16-30-1 - 10 (1985); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 154.01 - .15 (West 1989);
WYO. STAT. §§ 35-22-101 - 109 (1988).
29. These areas are described as non-statutory because there is no set format, only a
blank section to be filled in by the executor or executrix. See infra note 32.
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tient must specifically describe any treatment desired or not desired,
the circumstances under which the will should become effective, and
interpretive guidelines."0 This writing personalizes the living will for
each executor. Unfortunately, specific and clear guidelines are not
easy to formulate and the result is often judicial action because of
ambiguous language."
The second form of living will is nonstatutory 2 The failure of a
state to adopt a living will statute does not preclude a resident of
that state from drafting a living will. Legislation merely serves as an
example for executors of living wills to follow. The right to execute a
living will stems ultimately from a person's constitutional 33 and com-
mon law 34 right to informed consent before receiving medical treat-
ment. 5 Indeed, the "other instructions" sections of statutory forms
are derived from these same principles.36
Several criteria are recognized by right-to-die proponents as au-
thoritative with regard to nonstatutory living wills and sections de-
scribed as nonstatutory3 7 These criteria are: 1) absent emergency
situations, medical personnel may be civilly liable if they provide
health-care treatment without a patient's informed consent; s 2) the
common law and constitutional right to refuse health-care treatment
offered to competent patients who are capable of making decisions is
not lost when the person becomes incompetent; 39 and 3) oral or writ-
30. Rosoff, supra note 3, at 12.
31. See infra note 40 and accompanying text.
32. Rosoff, supra note 3, at 11. This format is found in states without living will statutes
and in states with statutes that leave out specific components and provide space for other
instructions. Id.
33. Patients have a constitutional right to refuse medical treatment. See Harnish v.
Children's Hosp. Medical Center, 387 Mass. 152, 439 N.E.2d 240 (1982). This right must be
exercised while the patient is still competent. Therefore, the living will derives its constitution-
ality from the constitutional right to refuse medical treatment. Kornreich, Who Will Decide
Whether to Withhold or Withdraw Extraordinary Medical Treatment? The Constitutional
Right to a "Living Will", 6 PROB. L.J. 33, 37 (1984). See also infra notes 35 and 81.
34. See Saunders v. State, 129 Misc.2d 45, 492 N.Y.S.2d 510 (1985). See also infra
note 79.
35. Cohen, State-by-State Summary of Legal Authority for Living Wills, 5 THE COM-
PLEAT LAW., Fall 1988, at 15. The right to refuse medical treatment is not absolute. A state's
interests may override this right. Such state interests include: preserving life, protecting inno-
cent third parties and incompetent patients, and maintaining the integrity of the medical pro-
fession. Kornreich, supra note 33, at 37. See generally In re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 529 A.2d
404 (1987); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976); President's Comm'n Report,
supra note 2, at 31-32.
36. Rosoff, supra note 3, at 12.
37. Cohen, supra note 35, at 16.
38. Informed consent encompasses the duty of a physician to disclose to a patient, in the
exercise of reasonable care, any risks of injury that might be incurred from a proposed course
of treatment, so that the patient may exercise reasonable judgment in accepting or declining to
accept the proposed course of treatment. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 701 (5th ed. 1979).
39. A person is competent when he or she has the capacity to understand and appreciate
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ten directives, if specific enough, will be recognized as a refusal of
consent."0 Unfortunately, few guidelines exist to help determine what
"specific enough" means. This creates problems with both statutory
and nonstatutory living wills.
The technology of life-support systems is so new that little clear
and settled language exists concerning life-prolonging procedures
and their application. The medical and legal professions must strive
to provide precise and consistent terminology so that society can en-
joy the benefits of living wills and guard against the possibility of an
undignified death. 41 The lack of definite technical language raises
the issue of whether a living will adequately protects the rights of
the terminally ill on paper as well as in practice.
B. Legislative Dilemmas
Legislatures have encountered great difficulty in drafting an ef-
fective declaration that allows persons to exercise the right to decide
which types of health-care treatment should be used if they become
incompetent during terminal illness. In attempting to avoid the judi-
cial system, these statutory declarations have only complicated the
decision-making process by being too narrowly drafted or inade-
quately worded.42 Changes must be made to avoid problems of inter-
pretation so that the living will may become an authoritative docu-
ment. For example, particular and specific instructions, present in
both statutory and nonstatutory living wills, should be made clear. In
drafting the living will, certain terms,4" such as "terminally ill," "he-
roic measures," and "life prolonging procedures," must be avoided so
as not to contradict the statutory form itself or, in nonstatutory
forms, so as not to create more confusion rather than clarity.
the nature and consequences of a medical decision, including risks, benefits, and alternatives to
treatment. Rosoff, supra note 3, at 11. The person must also have the capacity to communicate
a decision. Id.
40. Cohen, supra note 35, at 16. States disagree on the amount of specificity sufficient to
be recognized as an oral or written refusal of consent. Some have held that oral statements
attested to by family members may be enough. See Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc.,
398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986). Others have held that non-statutory written directives
were necessary. See John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 926
(Fla. 1984). Bludworth accepts the "substituted judgment" doctrine. Under the 'doctrine of
substituted judgment, close family members or legal guardians substitute their judgment for
what they believe the terminally ill incompetent person, if competent, would have done under
the circumstances. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d at 921. If the terminally ill incompetent person,
while competent, had executed a living will, that will is persuasive evidence of the incompetent
person's intention and should be given great weight by those persons who substitute their jugd-
ment on behalf of the terminally ill incompetent person.
41. See infra notes 64-81, 85-92, 93-99 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 51-64 and accompanying text.
43. See infra notes 44-64 and accompanying text.
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Two areas of terminological vagueness exist that invite interpre-
tation problems.44 One area concerns the language describing a pa-
tient's condition. The other area concerns the types of medical treat-
ment, or a patient's desire to avoid certain medical treatment.
Examples of the former include phrases such as "terminally ill" and
"no reasonable expectation of recovery." "Heroic measures," and
"life-prolonging procedures" are examples of the latter. 5 Both types
of terminology have produced multiple interpretations in the medical
community. When faced with such phrases, doctors frequently re-
main unsure of the patient's directives and consequently take no ac-
tion for fear that their interpretation will not be honored by the
state.4 7 Moreover, state statutory schemes define these terms incon-
sistently, when defined at all.48
The purpose of refusing or terminating life-sustaining treatment
is to allow a natural death or to prevent prolonging life by artificial
means. Dying with dignity is the goal. Thus, a patient's condition
must be terminal49 before a living will becomes effective. The deter-
mination of when a patient's condition is terminal, however, is not as
clear as many believe."
C. Defining Vague Terminology
State directives as to when a living will should become effective
differ, but it appears that most states have decided that when a per-
son's medical condition becomes terminal, advance directives should
become effective. 1 Unfortunately, a precise definition of "terminal
44. Emanuel & Emanuel, The Medical Directive: A New Comprehensive Advance Care
Document, 261 J. A.M.A. 3288, 3289 (1989).
45. Carey, supra note 6.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., infra note 51.
49. Living wills are activated when only extraordinary procedures will sustain a patient's
life. Extraordinary or life-sustaining procedures are only used when a patient's condition is
terminal. Therefore, living wills become effective when a patient's condition becomes terminal.
Kornreich, supra note 33, at 35.
50. In one sense, everyone has a terminal condition. See D. CLIFFORD, supra note 26, at
6:13.
51. Maryland proposes that a condition is terminal if it is incurable. MD. HEALTH-GEN.
CODE ANN. §§ 5-601 - 614 (1990). See also Hoffman, Planning for Medical Decision Mak-
ing: Living Wills and Durable Powers of Attorney, 38(2) MD. MED. J. 154, 156 (Feb. 1989).
Arizona defines terminal condition as an "incurable or irreversible condition from which, in
the opinion of the attending physician, death will occur without the use of life-sustaining pro-
cedures." ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3201(6)(1980). Connecticut describes terminal as "in-
capacitat[ion] to the point when [one] can no longer take part in decisions for [one's] own
life." 1985 CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 19a-570 - 575 (Supp. 1989). Mississippi simply states that if
no "meaningful recovery" is possible, the living will should become effective. MIss. CODE ANN.
§§ 41-41-101 to -121 (Supp. 1989). These are but a few examples of the various statutory
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condition" does not exist. A terminal condition has been defined as
an "incurable or irreversible condition that, without the administra-
tion of life-sustaining treatment, will, in the opinion of the attending
physician, result in death within a relatively short time."52 The ques-
tion then arises: should "terminal condition" mean that death will
result with or without the use of treatment?5" Perhaps terminal con-
dition can be defined in relation to "life-prolonging" procedures; that
is, a terminal condition has resulted when life-prolonging procedures
become necessary. 54 What are "life-prolonging" procedures?55 What
about those illnesses that are terminal, but might not result in death
for a number of years? Despite the ambiguity surrounding the
phrase "terminal condition," twenty-three jurisdictions56 still require
interpretations.
52. Uniform Rights of the Terminally III Act, 9B U.L.A. 609 (1989), at prefatory note.
See also, ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3201 - 3210 (1986); HAW. REV, STAT. §§ 327D-I - 27
(Supp. 1989); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 2, para. 701-710 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989).
53. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 22-8A-1 - 22-8A-10 (1984); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§§ 7185- 7195 (West Supp. 1989); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2421 - 2430 (1989); FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 765.01 - .15 (1986); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4501 - 4509 (1985 & Supp. 1989).
54. Life-prolonging procedures become necessary when a patient suffers from an incur-
able condition and medical treatment serves only to postpone the patient's inevitable death.
Kornreich, supra note 33, at 34 n.6.
55. The American Medical Association defines "[l]ife-prolonging treatment as includ-
ing: medication and artificially or technologically supplied respiration, nutrition and hydra-
tion." AMA COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, WITHHOLDING OR WITHDRAWING
LIFE-PROLONGING MEDICAL TREATMENT (Mar. 15, 1986) cited in Francis, The Evanescence
of Living Wills, 14 J. CONTEMP. L. 27, 33 (1988). There is no absolute definition, however, of
"life-prolonging procedures."
A large number of states exclude nutrition and hydration from the types of life-sustaining
treatment that may be refused in a living will. See, e.g., ARIz. REV, STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3201 -
3210 (1986); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-18-101 - 15-18-113 (1987); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-8-
11-1 to -22 (Burns 1990). Simply because a type of procedure has been omitted from a living
will does not necessarily suggest a refusal of such treatment. Since there are a variety of ways
to define life-sustaining treatment, it is best to state explicitly what treatment is or is not
desired and when it should be terminated. Francis, The Evanescence of Living Wills, 14 J.
CONTEMP. L. 27, 35 (1988). Problems such as these exhibit the difficulties that the drafters of
living will legislation face.
56. The states that require a "terminal condition" before the activitation of their statu-
tory living will directives are as follows: ALA. CODE §§ 22-8A-1 to -10 (1984); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3201 - 3210 (1986); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West
Supp. 1989); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 §§ 2501-2509 (1983); D.C. CODE ANN, §§ 6-2421 - 2430
(1989); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 3270-1 - 27 (Supp. 1989); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4501-4509 (1985
& Supp. 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-28, 101 to 65-28, 120 (1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
40:1299.58.1-.10 (West Supp. 1990); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 5-601 - 614 (1990);
MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-101 - 121 (Supp. 1989); NH. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 137-H:1 to
H:16 (Supp. 1989); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7-1 - 11 (1986); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 23-06.4-01
to 14 (Supp. 1989); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 3101-3111 (West Supp. 1990); OR. REV.
STAT. §§ 97.050-.090 (1987); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-77-10 - 160 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1989);
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 672.001 (Vernon 1990); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-1101 -
1118 (Supp. 1989); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.122.010 to .905 (Supp. 1989); W. VA.
CODE §§ 16-30-1 - 10 (1985); WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 154.0l-.15 (West 1989); WYo. STAT. §§
35-22-101 - 109 (1988).
Kutner had proposed that once a patient has become incurably injured or ill and is incom-
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the attending physician to certify that the patient's condition is ter-
minal before a living will can become effective. 7 Clearly, the
problems that legislators face in enacting living will legislation are
difficult to resolve. Because problems exist in many areas, however,
the interpretation of terminal condition is not the only area that re-
quires consistency.
Living wills contain a variety of vague terms used to describe
the condition a patient must be in before life-support systems can be
terminated." The term "irreversible coma" 59 has met with a pleth-
ora of interpretations by the medical profession. At one time, this
phrase was used interchangeably with the term "brain dead."6 °
Twenty years ago, neurological experts used the term to describe pa-
tients in a persistent vegetative state.61 At present, it is also used as a
general term describing permanently unconscious patients.6 " The
phrase "chronically and irreversibly comatose"6" causes even greater
confusion and should be abandoned. 4
petent, the living will would speak for the patient's further consent. Kutner, supra note 4, at
550-51.
57. Arkansas is one state that does not require that a patient's illness be terminal. ARK.
STAT. ANN. §§ 20-17-201 to -218 (Supp.1987). Instead, a living will may be activated if two
physicians sign a statement which declares that extraordinary means are necessary to prolong
life. Id. Comment, Comparison of the Living Will Statutes of the Fifty States, 14 J. OF CON-
TEMP. L. 105, 111 n.43 (1988).
58. D. CLIFFORD, supra note 26.
59. In an irreversible coma, the patient's brain is completely destroyed, accompanied by
a coma that remains irreversible. Cranford, The Persistent Vegetative State: The Medical
Reality (Getting the Facts Straight), HASTINGS CENTER REP., Feb.-Mar. 1988, at 28.
The term "irreversible condition" is frequently used, with confusing results. The following
states use this term in their statutory living will forms: ALASKA. STAT. §§ 18.12.010 - .100
(1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-17-201 to -218 (Supp. 1989); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 327D-1 -
27 (Supp. 1989); ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 701-710 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989); IOWA
CODE ANN. §§ 144A.l-.1 1 (West 1989); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1299.58.1 - .10 (West
Supp. 1990); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 2921-2931 (Supp. 1989); MONT. CODE ANN. §§
50-9-101 - 50-9-104, 111, 201-206 (1989); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 449.540-.690 (1989).
60. REPRESENTATIVES OF THE AD Hoc COMM. OF THE HARVARD MEDICAL SCHOOL TO
EXAMINE THE DEFINITION OF BRAIN DEATH, A Definition of Irreversible Coma, 205 J, A.M.A.
85 (Aug. 1968).
61. Cranford, supra note 59, at 28. A patient in a "persistent vegetative state" exper-
iences a coma that may last from a few days to a few weeks. The patient will then exist in a
condition of eyes-open unconsiousness, called the persistent vegetative state. Id. This condition
differs from "brain death" in that, in the persistent vegetative state, the brain stem remains in
working condition carrying out higher cerebral functions, such as respiration and reflexes.
With brain death, all brain stem functions cease except for those that are semi-autonomous,
such as the heartbeat. Id. at 27.
62. Cranford, supra note 59, at 28.
63. No present statute uses this term. However, the term has been used frequently in the
past by the medical community. See Cranford, supra note 59, at 27.
64. A comatose patient will remain in a comatose state for weeks or months, but not for
years. Chronic, by definition, means "of long duration." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTION-
ARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 240 (New College ed. 1978). Therefore, the characterization
of chronically comatose is inaccurate. A patient cannot have both a chronic condition and be
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Unfortunately, no magical words exist to define when a living
will should become operative. Legislators must work with language
already in existence and strive to avoid the use of ambiguous
language.
III. Judicial Intervention
A. Ambiguity Compels Judicial Intervention
In a situation in which a patient is not competent to make medi-
cal decisions and the patient's living will is ambiguous, decisions re-
garding the patient's treatment may be made by a designated
proxy.65 The patient may appoint a medical surrogate decision-
maker or an attorney-in-fact with a medical durable power of attor-
ney granted by the patient while still competent.66 Absent this type
of prior designation, or in the case of disputes concerning future
treatment, decisions will have to ultimately be resolved by the judi-
cial system. Unfortunately, it is difficult to foresee the problems that
may arise. The following cases represent some of the problems pre-
sent in today's living will.
Estelle Browning, a Florida resident, executed her living will in
November of 1985. The document directed that if she ever became
terminally ill, life-prolonging procedures should be withheld or with-
drawn.6" Specifically, she wrote in the "other instructions" section of
Florida's statutory form, "I do not desire that nutrition and hydra-
tion (food and water) be provided by gastric tube or intravenously if
necessary." 6 Mrs. Browning's living will, however, is still creating
controversy in the Florida court system, despite her death on July
16, 1989.69 She died before the court could interpret the directives
she thought were unambiguous. She received the specific treatment
she did not want because she included the ambiguous phrase "when
death is imminent" in her living will.
70
comatose. Cranford, supra note 59, at 28.
65. See infra note 127 and accompanying text.
66. Id.
67. Carey, supra note 6, at 63.
68. In re Browning, 543 So. 2d 258, 275 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
69. In re Browning, No. 88-02887 (Fla. Sept. 13, 1990) (LExIs, States library, Fla. file).
Mrs. Browning suffered a massive stroke on November 9, 1986. The stroke caused permanent
and irreversible brain damage. She remained unresponsive except with a slight reaction to
deep pain. On November 20, 1986, a gastronomy was performed to allow food and water to
flow directly into her stomach through an opening in her abdominal wall. In 1988, the tube
dislodged and a nasogastric tube, providing her only nourishment, fed her until her death. In
re Browning, 543 So. 2d 258, 261-62 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989). The Florida Supreme Court
handed down its decision on September 13, 1990. See infra note 83.
70. Browning, 543 So.2d at 275.
95 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW FALL 1990
Mrs. Browning's living will directed physicians to refrain from
applying life-sustaining procedures "when death is imminent" and
those procedures "serve only to artificially prolong the dying pro-
cess."" Doris Herbert, Browning's appointed legal guardian, took
the position that Browning's condition had reached the terminal
stage.72 On September 2, 1988, Mrs. Herbert filed a petition, based
on Browning's living will, to terminate artificial support. The trial
court denied this petition based solely upon statutory interpreta-
tion.73 The statutory issues presented were 1) whether the nasogas-
tric tube" was a life-prolonging procedure; and 2) whether Mrs.
Browning was suffering from a terminal illness. Both were answered
in the negative.75 The court ruled that Mrs. Browning's imminence
of death must be measured under conditions in which sustenance is
provided.76 The State argued that death was not imminent because
the nasogastric tube allowed Mrs. Browning to live indefinitely,77
even though without the tube she would have died within nine
days.7 Therefore, because Mrs. Browning's condition was not termi-
nal as that word is defined in the Florida Code, and because the
nasogastric tube was not a statutory life-prolonging procedure, no
remedy existed.
On appeal, the Florida District Court of Appeal had to decide
whether Mrs. Browning had any existing rights through the common
law or constitutional law that would authorize the remedy re-
quested." The court found that a right to refuse treatment existed
71. Id.
72. See Carey, supra note 6, at 63.
73. The trial court held that under the Life-Prolonging Procedure Act of Florida, FLA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 765.01-.15 (West 1986), no remedy existed. Browning, 543 So. 2d at 261.
Specifically, the court found that the language Mrs. Browning selected by placing an "X" in a
box designating that "nutrition and hydration" not be provided is not the standard statutory
language. Id. at 262. This language is within the same paragraph as the standard language,
"when death is imminent," and was therefore ambiguous. Id.
74. The nasogastric tube allows food and liquid to be introduced into the body through
the nasal cavity. It then passes into the stomach. In re Browning, 543 So.2d 258, 261 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
75. Id. at 264. "The term 'life-prolonging procedure' does not include the provision of
sustenance or the administration of medication or performance of any medical procedure
deemed necessary to provide comfort care or to alleviate pain." See FLA. STAT. ANN. §
765.03(3) (1986).
76. Browning, 543 So. 2d at 264. The living will would become effective under the Flor-
ida statute if death remained imminent even with the use of the nasogastric tube.
77. Id. at 262. The guardian argued that Mrs. Browning's condition was terminal be-
cause her death would be imminent if the nasogastric tube were removed. "Imminent" is not
defined under the Florida Act. Moreover, the definition of "terminal condition" in section
765.03(6) does not indicate the conditions under which death is imminent. See FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 765.03(6) (1986).
78. Browning, 543 So. 2d at 264.
79. In re Browning, 543 So.2d 257, 264 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989). The court affirmed
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based upon an individual's right to self-determination under the
common law.8" Further, case law had established that an incompe-
tent patient also has a constitutional right to refuse medical treat-
ment. 8' Relying on these two rights, the appellate court concluded
that Mrs. Browning's right to die existed and life-prolonging proce-
dures should be terminated."2 The remedy provided by the court and
the subsequent procedures suggested by the court to protect that
remedy are all derived from a patient's right to make personal and
private decisions. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed and adopted
the reasoning of the District Court of Appeal.8"
Mrs. Browning, in executing her living will, thought she had
taken care of her future. She even executed a more recent will to be
certain that her earlier one would remain enforceable.8" Unfortu-
nately, the ambiguity of a few seemingly clear words destroyed her
efforts. Mrs. Browning's desire to avoid the use of life-prolonging
treatment when her death became imminent was not fulfilled by her
previously executed living will; her relief came from her common law
and her constitutional right to self-determination. Mrs. Browning's
wishes were fulfilled long after they could have been had her living
the trial court's decision that termination of treatment was not permitted by the statute. The
district court, however, held that Mrs. Browning was entitled to relief under the state constitu-
tion, which expressly recognized every citizen's basic right of privacy. See also Corbett v.
D'Alessandro, 487 So.2d 368, 379 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986), review denied, 492 So. 2d 1331
(Fla. 1986).
80. Browning, 543 So. 2d at 266. See In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985);
In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
858 (1981). See also supra note 34.
81. Browning, 543 So. 2d at 267. See In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 419 (1987);
In re Westchester County Medical Center, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 531 N.E.2d 607, 534 N.Y.S.2d
886 (1988); In re Grant, 109 Wash.2d 545, 757 P.2d 534 (1987). This right still exists when a
person becomes incompetent, but it must be delegated to a surrogate decision-maker or proxy.
See also supra note 33; infra note 94 and accompanying text.
82. The district court then authorized the guardian to make the decision in accordance
with procedures established in the opinion. Browning, 543 So. 2d at 271-73.
83. In re Browning, No. 88-02887 (Fla. Sept. 13, 1990) (LExIs, States library, Fla. file).
The Florida Supreme Court decided that the guardian of an incompetent patient who suffers
from an incurable but not terminal condition may exercise the patient's right of self-determi-
nation to forego sustenance provided artificially by a nasogastric tube. Specifically, the su-
preme court agreed with the district court's assertion that Mrs. Browning's right of self-deter-
mination, or right of privacy, controlled the case. Id. Further, the court held that there was no
basis for drawing a constitutional line between the protections afforded to. competent and in-
competent persons. Both have the constitutional right to accept or reject medical treatment.
The individual's right to chart his or her own course of medical treatment in the event of later
incapacity must be safeguarded. In this case, all of the conditions established by Mrs. Brown-
ing in her declaration were satisfied. Therefore, Mrs. Browning's guardian was correct in in-
structing the health-care providers to discontinue all life-sustaining procedures in accordance
with Mrs. Browning's wishes. Id.
84. Browning, 543 So. 2d at 262. Mrs. Browning even provided a copy of her living will
to her doctor. Id.
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will not been ambiguous.
A situation similar to that in Browning was addressed in the
case of Evans v. Bellevue Hospital.85 In Evans, the petitioner
brought an action to enjoin the patients's medical treatment pursu-
ant to the patient's nonstatutory living will. 6 Despite the petitioner's
attempts to comply with the patient's living will, the hospital began
life-sustaining treatment.87 The hospital felt that the phrase, "mean-
ingful quality of life" was ambiguous. This ambiguity precluded the
court from allowing the patient's living will to create a basis upon
which to grant relief.8 Further, the court declined to accept peti-
tioner as the proper person to interpret the ambiguous phrase.89 For
the petitioner to prevail, he had to demonstrate with clear and con-
vincing evidence that 1) the patient was incompetent and 2) there
was no hope of recovery from the present danger, the stupor, or the
overall disease itself."0 These requirements were not met. The peti-
tioner did not find it necessary to appeal the court's decision. 91
An important legal issue arose from Evans that has yet to be
resolved. Evans questioned whether a person, appointed on the pa-
tient's behalf as a proxy for medical decision-making, may interpret
ambiguities in a living will and then subsequently reject life-sus-
taining treatment. 2 In Evans, if the answer to this question had
85. N.Y.L.J., July 28, 1987, at 11, col. I (No. 16536/87 N.Y. Sup. Ct., July 27, 1987).
86. Id. The patient, Tom Wirth, had been suffering from AIDS-related-complex and
brain lesions, and subsequently fell into a stupor. Previously, he had given the petitioner, John
Evans, a power of attorney. Evans brought this action pursuant to the power of attorney to
decline medical treatment on behalf of the patient. Id.
87. Id. Mr. Wirth's living will was executed on April 13, 1987 and stated: "life-sus-
taining procedures should be withheld or withdrawn if I have illness, disease or injury or expe-
rience extreme mental deterioration, such that there is no reasonable expectation of recovering
or regaining a meaningful quality of life." Id.
88. Id. The living will did not apply initially because of the ambiguity. The court refused
to grant relief based on mere speculation. Specifically, the hospital asserted that, given the
treatment being administered, the patient would recover within two weeks. In fact, two physi-
cians testified to this. Id.
89. Id. The court refused to accept Evans's assertion that the patient already considered
his condition not "a meaningful quality of life." Id.
90. Evans v. Bellevue Hospital, N.Y.L.J., July 28, 1987, at 11, col. I (No. 16536/87
N.Y. Sup. Ct., July 27, 1987). See also Delio v. Westchester County Medical Center, 129
A.D.2d 1, 516 N.Y.S.2d 677 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1987) (application to terminate tubal feed-
ing denied absent clear legislative or judicial guidance despite contrary clear and convincing
evidence); In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981), cert.denied,
454 U.S. 858 (1981) (life-sustaining treatment would be provided unless clear and convincing
evidence suggested otherwise, substituted judgment impermissible).
91. Contrary to the hospital's earlier prognosis and soon after this decision, it became
apparent that the patient would not recover. After a month of life-sustaining treatment while
remaining in a continuing stupor, health-care treatment ceased. The living will was honored
because there was now no hope of recovery. Tom Wirth died a week later. SOCIETY FOR THE.
RIGHT TO DIE, RIGHT TO DIE COURT DECISIONS Vol. II, at NY 8 (Oct. 1988).
92. The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that a proxy could make such a decision.
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been yes, the life of the patient would not have been unnecessarily
and unwillingly prolonged. If the patient's living will had not raised
a question of interpretation at the outset, the appointment of a proxy
would not have been necessary. Therefore, until the proxy issue is
resolved, care should be taken to make directives for each case spe-
cific and unambiguous.
An advance directive will not be enforced unless the language
employed applies to the circumstances at issue. Because the lan-
guage in living wills can be ambiguous without appearing so facially,
it is sometimes difficult to establish the exact desire of the patient at
the time the living will was executed, and in which circumstances
this desire should be applied. In re Kerr,9" exemplifies this problem.
The patient in Kerr had requested in her nonstatutory living will that
she be allowed to "die with dignity," avoiding life-prolonging proce-
dures. 9' The court held that dying from gangrene was not "dying
with dignity."95 Therefore, the hospital was given the authorization
to surgically amputate the patient's gangrenous limb to sustain her
life. 6 The living will was never effectuated. Moreover, the patient's
niece, who opposed this decision, failed to establish with clear and
convincing evidence that the patient wanted to die in the manner in
which she would have had the decision to authorize the surgery not
been granted. 97 Clear and convincing evidence of a patient's wishes
may preserve them.98 The patient's living will, which was executed to
avoid a medically prolonged life, proved to be worded inadequately,
and the patient's apparent wishes were not honored by the court. 99
The preceding cases demonstrate the importance of specificity
and precision when drafting living wills. The right to self-determina-
See In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 419 (1987). See also infra note 127 and accompany-
ing text.
93. No. 21748/86 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 17, 1986). In this case, Joan Essner, an 87 year-
old patient, was paralyzed from a stroke and dying of gangrene. The hospital requested surgi-
cal procedures to amputate her right leg above the knee and perform an anal circlage. The
patient's prognosis remained uncertain even if surgery was performed; it remained clear, how-
ever, that if surgery was not performed, the patient would die within weeks. The death would
be painful. The patient's niece argued that surgery would not be her aunt's wish. Id.
94. Cohen, supra note 35, at 15.
95. In re Kerr, No. 21748/86 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 17, 1986).
96. Id.
97. Id. See also supra note 89 and accompanying text.
98. See generally In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 419 (1987) (when a patient has
left clear and convincing evidence that he or she would not want to be sustained by life-
support, judicial review of a patient's preferences is unnecessary).
99. The author understands the unusual circumstances under which the court had to
make a decision. In effect, dying from gangrene is not a dignified death. It would seem, how-
ever, that there must have been a more compassionate method in which to decide this case.
The patient died while in surgery.
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tion should not be lost simply because the patient's noncognitive or
vegetative condition prevents a competent choice to refuse life-pro-
longing treatment. But this right will be lost unless care is taken
when drafting living will legislation. It is not always easy to antici-
pate future circumstances, including one's future medical condition.
Even with foresight, problems of how or when to apply a living will
arise. 00 Even though living wills too narrowly drawn or too generally
worded cannot always be completely avoided, care must be taken to
draft them as specifically as possible.'
B. Avoiding the Judicial System
Judicial intervention in construing living wills because they in-
clude ambiguous language must be avoided. Avoidance can only be
achieved by modifying the present requirements for a living will. It
is clear that an unambiguous living will has not yet been created.
The time to perfect the living will is now.
All words contain some ambiguity. However, some words and
phrases are more ambiguous than others.'0 2 Legislators must be se-
lective and strive to make the wording in living will statutes just
broad or narrow enough to encompass the rights of individuals who
are confronting death.'013 Rapidly advancing medical technology ne-
cessitates this transformation; changes must be made immediately.
Without change, unsuspecting executors of living wills may find their
100. "Even though millions of people have signed some kind of living will, almost no one
has fallen under a category that the statutes address." Blodgett, New "living wills", A.B.A. J.,
Sept. 1, 1986, at 24 (quoting George Annas, of the Boston University School of Medicine).
101. One proposal states, "I request that no ethically extraordinary means be used to
prolong my life, but that pain be alleviated if it becomes unbearable." "Extraordinary," in this
context, means "no reasonable hope of benefit or without increasing expense or grave burden."
CATHOLIC HEALTH ASS'N: CHRISTIAN AFFIRMATION OF LIFE, A STATEMENT OF TERMINAL ILL-
NESS (1982), cited in Laukfer, Living Wills and Durable Power Authorizing Medical Treat-
ment Decisions, 64 MICH. B.J. 684, 686 (1985). See also infra note 103.
102. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
103. Specific treatments that are or are not wanted should be listed. For example:
I do not want any treatment that merely prolongs my life if my attending
physician, based on reasonable medical judgment, determines that I am suffering
from an irreversible disease, illness, or injury that prevents me from communi-
cating and thinking. The treatments I do not want include (but are not limited
to): antiobiotics, artificial feeding, blood transfusions, chemotherapy, dialysis, re-
suscitation, hospitalization, medication (specify), respiratory support, [and] sur-
gery. The medical circumstances in which I would not want my life artificially
prolonged include, but are not limited to: irreversible dementia, severe brain
damage, and permanent unconsciousness (including irreversible coma and vege-
tative state.)
Rosoff, supra note 3, at 12. Further, one may ask for treatments in some circumstances, but
not in others. For example: "If I am severely demented, I want artificial feeding, but not a
respirator. If I am permanently unconscious, I do not want either artificial feeding or a respi-
rator." Id.
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cases entering the realm of judicial interpretation. The court may
not support the living will, and executors may find their right to self-
determination grounded in the common law 04 or in constitutional
law." 5 The executor's right of self-determination may not always be
based on the intentions expressed in the living will.' °6 This result
defeats the goal of the living will.
IV. Time for Change
A. Proposed Uniform Law
The best solution to the judicial and legislative morass is to
compile the most favorable aspects of current state living will stat-
utes and draft a uniform law. The National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws (Commissioners) attempted this
when they proposed the "Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act"
presented in August 1985.107 Purported to present a simple method
to enact a declaration, " provide for effectiveness of declarations in
states other than the one in which the declaration was executed, and
avoid inconsistencies in approach, the Act has met with limited suc-
cess.10 Although the Act has some shortcomings," ' it also has a
104. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
105. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
106. To remedy this problem some non-statutory documents specifically include a sever-
ability statement that claims, "My directions are also based on my constitutional and common
law right to control my medical treatment. If any provisions of this document are held to be
invalid, it will not affect the validity of the rest of the document." Rosoff, supra note 3, at 12.
In drafting legislation, it must be remembered that uniformity is important as a practical
matter. No guarantee exists that a declaration declining life-support systems signed in one
state will be honored in another, though many are. Reaves, Living Wills, Uniform Law Propo-
sal, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1984 at 29. See generally Saunders v. State, 1299 Misc.2d 45, 492
N.Y.S.2d 510 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1985).
107. UNIFORM RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL ACT, §§ 1-18 9B U.L.A. 609 (1989).
The Act's provisions apply to adults alone, and only to treatment that is life-prolonging. Living
wills follow the standard set forth by the Uniform Probate Code. The Code states that any
competent person 18 years or older may make a will. UNIFORM PROB. CODE § 2-501 (1975).
Only those patients whose terminal conditions are incurable and/or irreversible, whose death
will soon occur, and who are unable to participate in treatment decisions are affected. Blodg-
ett, supra note 100, at 24.
108. UNIFORM RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL ACT, supra note 107. See generally
Reaves, supra note 107, at 29.
109. Forty states and the District of Columbia have enacted living will legislation, but
only seven states have adopted the Uniform Act in its entirety. These seven states are: ALASKA
STAT. §§ 18.12.010-.100 (1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-17-201 to 218 (Supp. 1989); IOWA
CODE ANN. §§ 144A.I-.I I (West 1989); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 2921-2931 (Supp.
1989); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 459.010-.055 (Vernon Supp. 1990); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-9-
101 - 50-9-104, I1, 201-206 (1989); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 3101-3111 (West Supp.
1990). Jurisdictions have adopted portions of the Uniform Act, but have also departed sub-
stantially from the Act. Added material could not be clearly distinguished from the Act itself.
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 19a - 570 - 575 (Supp. 1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 765.01 -. 15
(West 1986).
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number of promising points."'
The Commissioners recognized the problems surrounding the
statutory terms "life-sustaining" and "terminal condition." "Termi-
nal condition" was defined in terms of "life-sustaining" and vice-
versa." 2 Neither term conveys a concrete meaning, and hence can-
not be distinguished. These terms require the physician to determine
whether medical treatment is merely postponing death before the liv-
ing will becomes effective. This results in considerable delay because
the physician is faced with a formidable task.
To remedy this confusion, the Commissioners attempted to clar-
ify certain phrases that are essential to preparing a proper declara-
tion. The Act reads:
If I should have an incurable or irreversible condition that
will cause my death within a relatively short time, and I am no
longer able to make decisions regarding my medical treatment, I
direct my attending physician, pursuant to the Uniform Rights
of the Terminally Ill Act of this State, to withhold or withdraw
treatment that only prolongs the process of dying and is not nec-
essary to my comfort or to alleviate pain. 1
13
The word "condition" contemplates a state that could be caused by
an accident as well as by an illness that will lead to death. Further,
the Act separates this definition from that of "life-sustaining treat-
ment" by stating that death will occur in a "relatively short time"
simply from the "condition." In this way, in determining a terminal
110. A critique of the Act reveals that the commissioners confused the meaning of "ter-
minal condition" by using the word "or" between the words "incurable" and "irreversible" in
the definition section of the Act. UNIFORM RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL ACT, supra note
107, at 612. Perhaps the word "and" would be a better choice since it would not limit the
interpretation of the Act to specific treatments. Both words, "incurable" and "irreversible,"
need not be present as they convey the same meaning.
Further, in using the term "irreversible," the Act contradicts its purpose and the idea that
because of new technology prolonging life, living will legislation was enacted. In short, any
treatment that would keep a patient alive may not be withheld or withdrawn according to the
Act unless the patient would die within a "relatively short time." This then only allows the Act
to apply to life-sustaining treatment, not to all medical treatment. Marzen, The "Uniform
Rights of the Terminally Ill Act" A Critical Analysis, I ISSUES IN LAW & MED. 444 (1986).
Additionally, the phrase "relatively short time" remains as ambiguous as the word "immi-
nent" in this context. Physicians are uncertain about the exact length of time the phrase pur-
ports to depict, and as a result they avoid it. Id.
11. See infra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
112. "Terminal condition" sometimes means death must occur or be imminent regard-
less of "life-sustaining treatment." Further, "life-sustaining treatment[s]" are those that may
prolong dying or conversely fail to prevent death. This latter phrase suggests death is imminent
even with the use of such treatment. One must then ask: Why discontinue the treatment in the
first place? Rizzo, The Living Will: Does it Protect the Rights of the Terminally Ill?, N.Y.S.
J. OF MED., at 72, 74 (1989). See also supra note 47 and accompanying text.
113. UNIFORM RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL ACT, supra note 107, § 2, at 614.
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condition, the use of medical procedures is not an issue."' The Act
best clarifies the problems surrounding the phrase "death is immi-
nent.""' Even though the use of the phrase "relatively short time"
answers some questions concerning the use of the word "imminent,"
it is still not the best phrase. Although the Act appears to be the best
solution to ambiguous phrases at present, any benefits the Act may
facially appear to provide in clearing up the ambiguity in these
phrases are still outweighed by its shortcomings."
6
B. Allowing the Patient to Decide
Another suggestion, proposed by Linda L. Emanuel and Ezekial
J. Emanuel, attempts to create an ideal living will declaration and is
entitled The Medical Directive. 7 The directive is divided into five
sections:" 8 1) an introduction; 2) a section containing four paradig-
matic scenarios of illness in which preferences for medical care are
given;" 9 3) a section for the designation of a proxy decision
maker; 2 ' 4) a section for organ donation; and 5) a section for a
personal statement.
12
In an attempt to eliminate linguistic vagueness, section two of
the directive addresses a patient's positive requests for treatment. In
this section, patients consider actual illness situations, evaluate com-
mon types of life-sustaining health-care treatment, and designate
their own treatment preferences. 22 The four scenarios presented al-
low the physician or counselor to educate the patient on life-sus-
taining terminology, thereby enabling the patient to make informed
decisions. 2 ' Specifically, the patient's options include the refusal of
114. Rizzo, supra note 112, at 75.
115. Id.
116. See supra note 110.
117. This directive seeks to remedy the vagueness, inflexibility, and poor communication
present in advanced care directives. See Emanuel & Emanuel, supra note 44. It is also in-
tended to enable such directives to be used more widely in clinical practice. id.
118. Id. at 3289.
119. See infra notes 122-25 and accompanying text.
120. See infra note 127 and accompanying text.
121. The personal statement section simply allows patients to reiterate more accurately
their personal values and goals of treatment. Emanuel & Emanual, supra note 44, at 3291.
122. Id. This section provides a context for a patient's wishes to be explored in addition
to an evaluation of the patient's view of life.
123. The four scenarios are as follows:
[W]hen the patient is in an irreversible coma or a persistent vegetative
state, but with no terminal illness (situation A); when the patient is in a coma
with a small and uncertain chance of recovery (situation B); when the patient
has some brain damage causing mental incompetence and is terminally ill (situa-
tion C); and when the patient has some brain damage causing mental incompe-
tence without any terminal illness (situation D).
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care and the chance to affirm requests to intervene in twelve com-
mon treatment categories.' 24 These categories cover various areas of
mental incompetence and address the concerns that have led to judi-
cial intervention.' 25 The Medical Directive demonstrates significant
improvements in declarations regarding incompetent patients' prefer-
ences in life-sustaining treatments. Because the directive limits ter-
minological vagueness, provides strong evidence of patients' wishes,
and simplifies terminology, it makes great strides in the drafting of
living wills. Unfortunately, a facial analysis fails to indicate how the
directive will fare in actual implementaion. Its success can only be
evaluated through its application.
C. Proxy Decision Making
Perhaps the trouble with the living will lies within its four cor-
ners. That is, the living will contains certain limitations that prevent
it from being applied efficiently in contemporary medicine.12 These
limitations coupled with vague terminology create a declaration
whose application may be very limited. To compensate for the defi-
ciency, the current trend appears to be the incorporation into the
living will of an option for durable power of attorney decision-
making.1
2 7
Traditionally, physicians looked to family members to make de-
cisions for incompetent patients.'28 Many patients, however, prefer
an option to appoint a proxy. The durable power of attorney provides
this option and is more flexible than the appointment of a proxy by
Id. at 3291.
124. The categories listed are: cardiopulmanary resuscitation, mechanical breathing, ar-
tificial nutrition and hydration, major surgery, kidney dialysis, chemotherapy, minor surgery,
invasive diagnostic tests, blood or blood products, antiobiotics, simple diagnostic tests, and pain
medications, even if they dull consciousness and indirectly shorten the life. Id. at 3290.
125. See generally Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 398 Mass. 417, 497
N.E.2d 526 (1986); In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987); In re Conroy, 98 N.J.
321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
126. The living will is limited because it: 1) is addressed specifically to physicians, which
excludes allowing others to make health-care decisions; 2) is only binding once the patient's
condition becomes terminal; and 3) applies only to the use of life-support systems, not to other
health-care treatments. See D. CLIFFORD, supra note 26, at 6:15. See also Blodgett, supra
note 100, at 24.
127. The durable power of attorney enables a patient to appoint someone else to serve as
a proxy (sometimes called a medical surrogate, decision-maker agent, health-care agent or
attorney in fact). The proxy makes treatment decisions based on the patient's wishes, or if
these are not known, in the patient's best interests. Rosoff, supra note 3, at 16. See also
Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 222, 741 P.2d 674, 689 (1987).
128. See In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10,
355 A.2d 647 (1976).
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someone other than the patient. 29 Proxy provisions'3 ° and durable
power of attorney acts 3' provide the legal authority for health-care
proxies. Some commentators and legislators support the durable
power of attorney law alone.' 32 But the living will remains necessary
as both a guide and as a precaution to ensure that the proxy is fol-
lowing the patient's wishes. '33 The best method is to incorporate the
durable power of attorney into the living will.13 Further, to maxi-
mize protection, the same person 'should be appointed as proxy in all
directives regarding health-care treatment.'35
The use of durable power of attorney is still in its infancy.
There are no legal precedents establishing durable power of attorney
authority for terminating life-support systems. The New Jersey Su-
preme Court fleetingly addressed the issue in In re Peter.136 It is
interesting to note that the court interpreted New Jersey's durable
power of attorney statute to authorize a proxy appointment, even
though the statute does not expressly authorize proxy medical
129. The durable power of attorney should be given to someone the patient trusts and
who is cognizant of the patient's treatment preferences. An alternative proxy should be ap-
pointed in case the primary proxy becomes unavailable. Rosoff, supra note 3, at 13.
130. States that have specifically allowed the living will declaration to include an option
for a durable power of attorney are as follows: ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-17-201 to 218 (Supp.
1989); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 §§ 2501-2509 (1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 765.01-.15 (West
1986); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4501 - 4509 (1985 & Supp. 1990); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
40:1299.58.1-.10 (West Supp. 1990); N.M. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7-1 - 11 (1986); TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 672.001 (Vernon 1990); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-1101 - 1118
(Supp. 1989); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-2981 to -2292 (1988); WYO. STAT. §§ 35-22-101 - 109
(1988). Others indirectly authorize this option. See HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 3290-I - 27 (Supp.
1989); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-8-11-1 to 22 (Burns 1990); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 144A.l-.11
(West 1989). Still others simply state that the family or physician should honor the declara-
tion as the final expression of the patient's legal right to refuse medical or surgical treatment.
Some examples of these states are: ALA. CODE §§ 22-8A-1 to -10 (1984); ARIz. REV. STAT,
ANN. §§ 36-3201 - 3210 (1986); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West Supp.
1989); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2421 - 2430 (1989).
131. Other states have passed separate laws sanctioning the durable power of attorney.
These laws authorize an appointment for the rejection of medical treatment to complement the
living will. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE § 2500 (West Supp. 1990); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 2,
para. 802-1 - 11 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit 18-A, § 5-501 (Supp.
1988); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 449.800 - .860 (Supp. 1989); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 23-4.10-1,
23-4.10.2 (1989).
132. See generally Leflar, Liberty and Death: Advance Health-Care Directives and the
Law of Arkansas, 39 ARK. L. REV. 445 (1986).
133. The living will is also necessary to guard against possible drawbacks when the du-
rable power of attorney exists by itself, These drawbacks include: the chance of death or inca-
pacity of the proxy; the proxy's refusal to act; and the possibility of an inadequately drafted
declaration. Moses, The Last Rights, 2 PROB. PRAC. REP. 1, 3 (1990).
134. Rosoff, supra note 3, at 14.
135. D. CLIFFORD, supra note 26, at 6:16.
136. 108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 419 (1987). The court stated that the best proof of a
patient's intent is a living will. However, it "would have been better" had Ms. Peter, the
executrix, specifically provided that Mr. Johanning, her proxy, had the authority to terminate
life-sustaining treatment. Id. at 371, 529 A.2d at 426.
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decisions. 137
Several guidelines have been proposed by the Society for the
Right to Die to ensure the enforceability of a durable power of attor-
ney in the state in which it is executed as well as in any state in
which such power might have to be implemented.13  If a person
chooses to execute both documents, the documents must be carefully
prepared so that each one remains consistent with the other.'1
9
V. Focusing on the Real Issue
Present living will statutes and declarations concentrate solely
on the effects of medical treatment 4 ' without adequately focusing on
the mental and physical condition of the patient. Moral concepts,
principles, and reasoning"" about the use of a living will should play
a larger role in the drafting process. Perhaps only two areas have to
be changed to better enable legislatures to effectively draft guide-
lines for the living will.
A. The Time Element
The first area legislators should address is the restrictive lan-
guage that is used in living wills. One of the most troublesome fea-
tures of state statutes is the language that restricts the application of
the directive.' 42 The statutes need detailed and precise terminology.
Specifically, the terms that dictate a time element, such as "death is
imminent" or "relatively short time," should be redrafted or elimi-
nated because they impose severe problems of interpretation. 143 The
wide-spread use of the living will is hampered by the problems in-
volved in interpreting these terms. The phrases are unclear and alien,
even to a physician's vocabulary.' As a result, most declarations
137. Id.
138. The Society recommends that the patient formulate his or her wishes regarding
medical treatment. Next, the patient should execute a living will (if no attorney will be taking
over) and/or a durable power of attorney (to guide the proxy in making health-care decisions).
Further, the patient should discuss his or her wishes with those who will be involved in making
medical treatment decisions for the patient. Each document should be updated periodically.
Finally, if the patient travels frequently to one area, steps should be taken to conform the
documents to the laws of that area so that the document is honored. Laukfer, supra note 101,
at 689.
139. D. CLIFFORD, supra note 26, at 6:16. See generally Francis, supra note 55.
140. Most statutory living wills define a terminal condition as if death is imminent with
or without the use of life-sustaining treatment. If death is imminent, the living will becomes
effective. See supra note 53.
141. See supra note 16.
142. See infra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
143. See infra notes 146-48 and accompanying text.
144. Rizzo, supra note 112, at 76.
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under state acts experience problems in this area due to vague lan-
guage. The lack of a definite interpretation coupled with a variety of
phrases defined within various state statutes impedes the usefulness
of the living will.
Perhaps the time element reference should be left out of the
declaration altogether. This would eliminate the difficulty of as-
signing a time period and would allow the decision-maker to focus on
the real issue, which is whether the life-sustaining treatment is a
benefit or a burden to the patient. 45 Effective terminology could be
drafted so that life-sustaining procedures would not be used solely to
"prolong artificially the dying process. '"14 A phrase similar to this
would be beneficial in a situation in which a patient is irreversibly
comatose, but may survive for more than a year.'47 Under the ex-
isting time element system, that patient could fail to qualify as ter-
minal, even though that patient's condition is, in all aspects, termi-
nal. If the effect of all life-sustaining treatment becomes the focal
point, rather than the treatment itself, the real issue of whether life-
sustaining treatment substantially benefits the patient will become a
major factor.
B. The Total Condition of the Patient
The phrase "life-sustaining treatment" must also be better un-
derstood. The phrase as it now stands is too limiting. 4" When re-
drafting this term, the main focus should be on the benefits and bur-
dens of all medical treatment on the patient, not merely those
treatments that sustain life.' 49 One suggested definition comes from
the Legal Advisory Committee of the Concern for Dying, which
reads:
Medical procedure or treatment shall mean any action
145. See supra note 140. The patient's life should be the central concern rather than the
treatment itself because it is the patient's life that is most precious. The care of the patient
must remain paramount. Living will directives will not be ambiguous if the patient's well-being
is kept in mind. Legislators will begin to understand the decisions that courts may have to
make and will then understand why judicial intervention should be avoided whenever possible.
146. See supra note 145.
147. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
148. The executor of a living will may want all medical treatment terminated, not
merely treatment considered life-sustaining, once a certain condition has occurred. For exam-
ple, some statutes do not include nutrition and hydration within the scope of the term "life-
sustaining." See supra note 55. An executor, however, may not want to authorize these treat-
ments despite their failure to be classified as life-sustaining. Therefore, the focal point when
redrafting the term "life-sustaining" should be on the mental and physical condition of the
patient, not on the treatment itself.
149. Frances, supra note 55.
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taken by a physician or health care provider designed to diag-
nose, assess, or treat a disease, illness or injury. These include,
but are not limited to, surgery, drugs, transfusion, mechanical
ventilation, dialysis, resuscitation, artificial feeding, and any
other medical act designed for diagnosis, assessment or
treatment."'
This definition meets the objective of focusing on both the benefits and bur-
dens of all medical treatment by avoiding the term "life-sustaining."'51 In
this way, treatment is withheld or withdrawn depending upon a balance of
the benefits of providing treatment and the burdens of prolonging death
with such treatment. This balance is determined by considering the total
condition of the patient, including his or her wishes. Again, the focus should
be on the patient, as it should be when redrafting the time element defini-
tion,"62 not on the treatment itself. If prolonging treatment negates any ben-
efits, then the treatment should be withheld or withdrawn. 6 Once states
adopt living will statutes that include these two changes, individuals will be
better able to exercise their right to die by executing an effective living will.
C. The Medical Profession Must Play a Role
Statutory declarations and court rulings codify the law in the
area of the right-to-die. They cannot, however, facilitate the deci-
sions of those intimately involved in these situations. Patients and
families face difficult dilemmas when deciding whether to terminate
treatment. They must weigh ethical, financial, medical, and legal
considerations to come to a decision. Not suprisingly, doctors also
weigh these same considerations when deciding whether to let the
patient die or to take steps to prolong life.
For the medical profession, life and death decisions are an eve-
ryday occurrence. At the same time, they are always difficult. Doc-
tors learn through experience. Many hospitals have now appointed
some of their doctors to ethics committees within the hospital itself
to advise other doctors on difficult moral issues.' 54 After years of
boasting about medical technology, doctors now realize that technol-
ogy often unnaturally prolongs the inevitable.
Medical terminology also requires clarity and consistency.
150. Rizzo, supra note 112, at 77.
151. Living will directives could terminate medical treatment by avoiding the term "life-
sustaining." This would create a less limiting definition and perhaps suit the needs of a larger
group of people. Further, if all treatments may be terminated, no ambiguity will exist regard-
ing specific treatments.
152. See supra note 143.
153. See supra note 145.
154. See generally Buckley, How Doctors Decide Who Shall Live and Who Shall Die,
U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REP., Jan. 22, 1990, at 50.
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Those who work most closely with the patient and life-prolonging
treatment should lay the groundwork for state legislatures to act.
Physicians and other medical personnel have the power to educate
the public about the persistent vegetative state and life-prolonging
treatment. Physicians, more so than legislators, are aware of which
terms are more accurate and create the least ambiguity. The medical
community should lay the groundwork by educating legislators about
terminal diseases and creating guidelines for the appropriate treat-
ments. Only through an understanding of the medical reality associ-
ated with this area can everyone involved, including families, medi-
cal personnel, and especially the judicial system, make informed and
caring decisions about living wills.
D. Immediate Changes are Necessary
Until legislative changes become a reality, some measures do
exist that can be taken when executing a living will to better ensure
its enforceability. The Society for the Right to Die' 55 and Concern
for Dying,"' suggest the following guidelines:' 57 1) discuss with your
doctor your wishes and make sure the doctor understands them and
places the living will in your medical file; 2) aim to be as specific as
possible when describing treatments desired or not desired and at
what point they are no longer desired; 3) designate a person familiar
with your personal philosophy and feelings about terminal care to
make health-care decisions for you; 4) sign the living will before two
witnesses and a notary; 5) give copies of the living will to next of kin,
clergyman, lawyer, and all others who may take part in the decision-
making process; 6) store the living will where your family can easily
find it; and 7) sign and date the document before a notary every two
to three years, and before witnesses every five years. If these recom-
mendations are followed, legal complications will decrease while leg-
islatures work on long-term modifications. The ultimate goal of cre-
ating a trouble-free living will, however, can only be realized through
nation-wide adoption of the proposed legislative changes set forth in
this Comment and other scholarly works.
155. The Society for the Right to Die is a nonprofit organization located at 250 West
57th Street, New York, New York, 10107.
156. Concern for Dying is a nonprofit organization located at 250 West 57th Street,
New York, New York, 10107.
157. Carey, supra note 6, at 64. See, Rosoff, supra note 3, at 14. See also, Rizzo, supra
note 112, at 78. See generally Engram, Coping: Mortal Matters, Baltimore Sun, Oct. 7, 1989,
at 5D, col. 1; Jones, Legal Significance of Living Wills, PA. MED. 34, 37 (Mar. 1989); Gibbs,
Love and Let Die, TIME, March 19, 1990 at 62, 68.
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VI. Conclusion
The living will provides the means through which the rights of
the terminally ill are protected. The potential of the living will, how-
ever, will not be fully realized until it is drafted with precision. Pres-
ently, no such form exists. Accordingly, state statutes need legisla-
tive revision. The most effective living will directive should be brief
and clear, without the use of ambiguous terminology. Further, it
should provide an area where executors give specific instructions con-
cerning treatments and conditions, and at what time to apply these
instructions. In addition, the ultimate living will directive should in-
clude an option to appoint a proxy to make medical decisions on
behalf of the executor carrying out the intentions of the patient. The
proxy and the living will should exist cohesively.' 58 This theoretical
declaration has the ability to become reality if state legislatures rec-
ognize the problems inherent in present statutory directives. Legisla-
tors should revise those statutes immediately, before any further
right-to-die decisions have to be made by the judicial system. Only
legislatures have the power to validate a living will and to formulate
"clear standards for resolving requests to terminate life-sustaining
treatment for incompetent patients."' 59 Legislators should strive for
uniformity and avoid restrictions that can be narrowly interpreted.
The focus should be shifted to a comprehensive consideration of the
condition of the patient, rather than a narrow look at the available
medical treatments. Effective living will legislation can only be
achieved once legislators understand the goals of the living will itself
and concentrate on those goals while drafting such legislation. Once
this is done, the judicial system will no longer have to interpret
right-to-die cases involving ambiguous living wills. Courts are not
equipped to handle these decisions involving tragic circumstances, 60
and should not be required to do so. At a time when the fear of
lingering before death outweighs the fear of death itself, the right to
die in a dignified manner must be preserved.
Susan J. Nanovic
158. D. CLIFFORD, supra note 26, at 6:16.
159. See Saunders v. State, 129 Misc.2d 45, 51, 492 N.Y.S.2d 510, 515 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1985). Clearly, it is the legislature, not the judicial system, that must overcome problems of
interpretation in the living will.
160. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
